Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Others Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another 1955 (Case Summary)

This case involves the interpretation of Article 13 and the doctrine of eclipse, which states that pre-constitutional laws rendered inoperative due to inconsistency with fundamental rights are not abrogated but merely eclipsed, allowing for revival upon the removal of such inconsistency.

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Facts of Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Others Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh

The petitioners operated as stage carriage operators (transport service) with permits granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.
The Central Provinces and Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 was enacted, empowering the Provincial Government to monopolize motor transport.
On January 26, 1950, the Constitution of India came into force. Article 19(1)(g) guaranteed citizens the right to practice any occupation, trade, or business, and Article 31(2) guaranteed their right to property.
The 1947 Act became inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(g) and 31(2), thereby triggering the application of Article 13(1), which renders laws “void” to the extent of their inconsistency with fundamental rights.
The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, amended Article 19(6) to expressly permit the State to create monopolies in certain businesses, including motor transport. This amendment effectively removed the inconsistency between the 1947 Act and Article 19(1)(g).
As a result of the First Amendment, the previously dormant 1947 Act was “revivified” and became operative.
On February 4, 1955, the State of Madhya Pradesh issued a notification declaring its intention to take over certain bus routes, excluding private operators such as the petitioners.
On April 27, 1955, the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 came into effect, further modifying Article 31. This amendment clarified that State regulations of businesses did not necessarily amount to the “acquisition” of property. The amendment narrowed the definition of “acquisition” under Article 31, explicitly stating that a law depriving a person of property would not be considered “compulsory acquisition” if it did not transfer ownership or possession to the state.
On May 27, 1955, the petitioners filed writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of the 1947 Act and the subsequent government notification on the ground that it violated Article 19(1)(g) as well as Article 31(2).
The petitioners contended that the creation of a state monopoly, which would effectively nullify their permits granted to them under Motor Vehicle Act, 1939, violated their constitutional rights. They argued that the permits constituted “property” under Article 31(2) and that the government’s actions, while not directly confiscating the permits, amounted to an acquisition of this property right. They further argued that the restrictions on their trade infringed upon their rights under Article 19(1)(g).

Issues framed

Whether the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 became void under Article 13(1) for being inconsistent with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 19(1)(g) and 31(2)?

Judgment of Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and Others Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh

The Hon’ble Supreme Court primarily considered the constitutionality of the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947, in light of Articles 13(1), 19(1)(g), 31(2) of the Indian Constitution and doctrine of eclipse, as well as the impact of subsequent constitutional amendments on the Act’s validity.

The C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947, became void under Article 13(1) of the Indian Constitution to the extent it conflicted with fundamental rights in Articles 19(1)(g) and 31(2). Initially valid when enacted, the Act conflicted with newly established fundamental rights following the Constitution’s commencement on January 26, 1950, as it allowed for a state monopoly in motor transport, infringing on the right to practice any profession and the right to property. Article 13(1) declares pre-constitutional laws void if inconsistent with fundamental rights, and the Supreme Court clarified that “void” means inoperative rather than entirely annihilated, applying the Eclipse Doctrine to the Act.

This doctrine allowed the Act to remain valid for past transactions and non-citizens while being revived by subsequent constitutional amendments: the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which allowed state monopolies in businesses, and the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, which clarified that certain regulations do not constitute compulsory acquisition.

Consequently, the Act was “revivified,” making it fully operative, and the notifications issued under it were upheld, dismissing the petitioners’ challenges and highlighting the complex relationship between laws and fundamental rights in India.

The Supreme Court held that the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947, was void under Article 13(1) due to its inconsistency with Articles 19(1)(g) and 31(2). However, the Act was revived by subsequent constitutional amendments, notably the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, which allowed for state monopolies in specific businesses. Consequently, the notifications issued under the Act were upheld, validating the state’s actions and dismissing the petitioners’ challenges. Further, the Supreme Court also differentiated the Indian application of the Doctrine of Eclipse from American jurisprudence. In the U.S. context, laws deemed unconstitutional are considered void ab initio (invalid from the outset). In contrast, Indian Pre-Constitution laws were valid until the Constitution came into force, providing a unique perspective on their operation under fundamental rights.